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The European Union (EU) has negotiated a comprehensive trade and investment agreement with Canada, and is currently negotiating one with the United States (US). Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a provision in most Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other International Investment Agreements (IIAs), gives investors the right to pursue arbitration with a state. The inclusion of this mechanism in both the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US, and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada has caused considerable public concern. Germany, as one of the most vocal opponents to ISDS in these trade agreements, is making headlines arguing in favor of removing ISDS provisions from the agreements, threatening the continuation of the TTIP negotiations and the ratification of the CETA. Germany has a longstanding history of negotiating BITs containing ISDS. As one of the originators of the concept, it seems surprising for many viewers to see Germany now opposing investment protection.  This essay will argue that Germany is seen as opposing the inclusion of ISDS in both the CETA and the TTIP primarily because it does not want it included in the TTIP with the US. Germany’s perceived opposition to ISDS in the CETA is thereby tied to the strategically more important TTIP. 

This essay is aimed to be part of a larger research effort designed to look at the transatlantic investment protection and ISDS debate. What are the pros and cons of investment protection? Is it a necessary component of transatlantic trade and investment agreements? Could the CETA and the TTIP play a role in setting global, more modern investment protection standards? Examining these possible factors of why the US, Canada and the EU behave the way they do with respect to this debate and casting them against some of the facts of how ISDS works and some of the rulings that have been made with respect to ISDS in the past, future research as part of an PhD hopes to contribute to the larger scholarship on foreign direct investment and the direction thereof. Any suggestions, comments and feedback with respect to either this paper or the intended future research in terms of designing a research proposal for possible PhD applications are welcome. 

The views and positions expressed in this essay do neither reflect those of the Canadian International Council nor the views and positions of the Government of Alberta. They are solely representative of the author’s own thinking. 
Introduction 

	In May 2009 the European Union (EU) and Canada began negotiating the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Five years later, in September 2014, the negotiations officially concluded, and the draft negotiator’s text is now undergoing a legal review, followed by translation and ratification in late 2015 through 2017. Similarly, in July 2013 the EU and the United States (US) began negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). With the conclusion of the 8th negotiation round in early February 2015, the TTIP negotiations are still ongoing. 
	One key element in both trade and investment agreements is the so-called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a provision present in most Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other International Investment Agreements (IIAs). ISDS gives investors the right to pursue arbitration with a state and its inclusion in both the CETA and the TTIP has caused considerable public concern. Germany, as one of the most vocal opponents of ISDS in these trade and investment agreements, is making headlines arguing in favor of removing or altering ISDS provisions from the two agreements, threatening the continuation of the TTIP negotiations and the ratification of the CETA. 
	Germany has a longstanding history of negotiating BITs containing ISDS. As one of the originators of investment protection, it seems surprising for many viewers to see Germany now questioning ISDS as part of both the CETA and the TTIP, begging the question of why. This essay will argue that Germany is seen as opposing the inclusion of ISDS in both the CETA and the TTIP primarily because it does not want it included in the TTIP with the US. Germany’s perceived opposition to ISDS in the CETA is thereby tied to the strategically more important TTIP. 
	To come to this conclusion, this essay will first provide a quick review of the current public and scholarly debates surrounding the two trade and investment agreements, and ISDS in particular. Doing so will allow situating Germany’s perceived opposition to ISDS in a greater anti-free trade and anti-globalization context. Second, this essay will provide some historical background on Germany’s role in defining the parameters of investment protection and track Germany’s position on ISDS throughout the CETA negotiations. The purpose here is to show that Germany is not actually opposed to ISDS in the CETA. Third, this essay will take a closer look at the linkages between the CETA and the TTIP and show that Germany’s opposition to ISDS in the CETA has nothing to with Canada, but everything to do with the TTIP and the US. The key element in this discussion is CETA’s role as a ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP. 
Part I: Overview of the ISDS Debate in the EU 
	There are many aspects to understanding the current climate within which the CETA, the TTIP and ISDS are currently discussed in Germany and elsewhere in the EU. Ever since the EU and the US started negotiations for the TTIP, ISDS has become a subject of extreme public scrutiny and debate. Already during the second round of TTIP negotiations in October 2013 ISDS was flagged as a major sticking point.​[1]​ In fact, during the third round of negotiations in December 2013 200 civil society groups sent a letter to both the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the EU Trade Commissioner expressing their opposition to ISDS and claiming it undermines democratic decision making.​[2]​ Consequently, negotiations for investment protection and ISDS in the TTIP negotiation rounds were put on hold in March 2014.  Since then, the EU has undergone a process of public consultation and engagement on the issue and is now working on reforming its ISDS framework.​[3]​ In contrast to the EU negotiations with Canada for the CETA, which occurred primarily behind closed doors, the negotiations with the US have enjoyed the spotlight from the very beginning. 
	As the EU and the US engaged in the TTIP negotiations, think tanks, research institutes and academics alike started debating the merits of a potential trade and investment agreement between the two sides. Conclusions on the overall merits of such an agreement vary from those warning against the perceived benefits of increased economic growth and employment as a result of TTIP​[4]​ to those highlighting its opportunities, both for businesses and for its geostrategic importance in terms of global governance. According to these assessments, the biggest gains from TTIP lie in the elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade, including meaningful changes to any regulations that inhibit transatlantic trade and investment flows.​[5]​ It is noteworthy, that similar discussions on the CETA did not really emerge until the prospect of negotiations between the EU and the US became more serious.​[6]​ At the outset of the CETA negotiations, debates on its potential merits and scope were mostly limited to the report Assessing the Costs and Benefits of a Closer EU-Canada Economic Partnership​[7]​, the Joint Report on the EU-Canada Scoping Exercise,​[8]​ the corresponding communications by the EU and Canada​[9]​ as well as the Council of Canadians’, a Canadian social action organization, lobbying efforts against the agreement.​[10]​ Other than that there was only limited public debate on the CETA, which changed as the EU and the US started negotiations for the TTIP.​[11]​ Through the TTIP then, CETA increasingly moved to the center of public attention, an important point to remember for later discussions in this essay. For now it suffices to note that it was within the discussions on the potential benefits of the TTIP, that public opposition against both the TTIP and the CETA emerged.  
Emphasizing the adverse impacts these agreements would have on civil society and democracy by giving corporations too much power over governments and their ability to regulate, various NGOs and civil society groups lobbied against the two agreements.​[12]​ Within this opposition to the CETA and the TTIP, the concept of investment protection and ISDS very quickly surfaced as a major sticking point with the public, expressed vividly through a collaboration of different civil society organizations standing behind the self-organized ‘Stop TTIP European Citizens’ Initiative’, and most recently expressed through the input provided to the EU’s consultation on ISDS.​[13]​ 
The idea of investment protection has its origins in the post-World War II (WWII) era and the negotiation of so-called International Investment Agreements (IIAs), or Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).​[14]​ ISDS, as one form of investment protection, describes a dispute settlement mechanism that is negotiated to give investors the right to sue the host state of their respective investments if they feel violated according to the terms set out in the corresponding IIA.​[15]​ It is exactly that, the ability of an investor to sue a government that frightens many of those opposing the inclusion of ISDS in the CETA and the TTIP.  
	Fifty years after the first IIAs and BITs were negotiated and signed; ISDS has become a familiar and well-known concept associated with the regulation of FDI. The somewhat close to 3000 international investment treaties that are signed to date give some indication of the popularity of investment protection. However, as IIAs have become more common and more governments have been sued by investors, ISDS has increasingly been criticized by those opposing an investor’s ability to sue a government for regulating in the name of public health, democracy or the environment.​[16]​ Criticism of ISDS, however, is not only found in public circles, but also within academic debates calling for reform of what is perceived to be an imperfect system in need for more clearly defined rules, more consistency between arbitration decisions, more transparency and a government’s ability to appeal.​[17]​ Vis-à-vis these various critics of ISDS are business associations or more conservative think tanks who are eager to demystify the concerns pertaining to ISDS, albeit calling for a modernization of the system addressing some of the concerns brought forward by civil society organizations and academics.​[18]​ 
	Together, those opposing ISDS in general, and those arguing in its defense, albeit with modifications, form a much heated debate on the usefulness and merits of ISDS, its necessity or even its desirability. In the midst of these debates are mass public protests challenging the EU to listen to citizen concerns regarding any perceived threats to state sovereignty, democracy and the environment. One famous example is the European Day of Action, on October 11, 2014 where dozens of civil society organizations organized protests across Europe challenging the very idea of free trade, ISDS and globalization.​[19]​ Organized under the name of the ‘Stop TTIP’ movement which is based out of Berlin, Germany, some EU citizens and civil society organizations are calling for a removal of ISDS from the TTIP and the CETA, some others are saying the two FTAs are unnecessary and any claimed benefits exaggerated.​[20]​ It is for the growing public opposition to ISDS, represented in this essay primarily by the ‘Stop TTIP’ movement and the associated civil society organizations and NGOs that the ISDS negotiations have been excluded from the TTIP negotiation rounds since the fourth round was held in March 2014. The mounting opposition against ISDS has led the EU to undergo a massive public consultation and engagement process on ISDS, the results of which were published in a report on January 13, 2015. 
	In the Commission Working Document- Report -Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor-to-state DisputeSettlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) (ISDS Online Consultation Report) the EU Commission highlighted the following four recommendations for improvements with respect to ISDS going forward: 
	the protection of the right to regulate;
	the establishment and functioning of arbitral tribunals;
	the relationship between domestic judicial systems and ISDS;
 	the review of ISDS decisions through an appellate mechanism.​[21]​
The publication of the EU consultation results indicate the EU’s desire to respond to citizen concerns, especially given its pending court challenge for refusing to recognize ‘Stop TTIP’ as a European Citizen Initiative.​[22]​ The ISDS Online Consultation Report, the pending court challenge, the mass protests against the CETA and the TTIP and the variety of different views when it comes to ISDS that emerged with the negotiations for the TTIP, illustrate the rather hostile environment when it comes to free trade and globalization within the EU as well as much of Germany. As countries engage in more comprehensive free trade negotiations, such as those of the CETA and the TTIP, public concerns arise regarding their impacts on state sovereignty, the environment and public health. In contrast to the critics of agreements like the CETA and the TTIP are those who are, just as passionately, defending the very premise of free trade and the opportunities that come from agreements like the CETA and the TTIP. Together, the many viewpoints brought forward in this debate represent the many aspects within which the current debates on ISDS occur. It is within the context of these debates and the inherent anti-free trade, and anti-globalization sentiments in the EU that Germany’s position on ISDS with respect to both the TTIP and CETA has to be examined. 
Part II: ISDS, Germany and Transatlantic Trade and Investment
	Germany has a longstanding history of negotiating international trade and investment agreements that feature investment protection. In fact, the country is deemed as one of the originators of the concept and as of 2014 is said to have negotiated around 147 so-called Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), the most of any EU country.​[23]​ 
	BITs are amongst the most common International Investment Treaties (IIAs), which are agreements between two countries that set out the undertakings of each party to guarantee just compensation in the case of expropriation.​[24]​ IIAs are designed to determine and guarantee investors rights’ in each other’s jurisdictions.​[25]​ Most BITs contain specific clauses allowing the contracting parties to give consent for arbitration in case of a dispute between a host state and an investor. Sometimes BITs, or their plurilateral counterparts, call for alternative mechanisms to arbitration that allow proceedings before domestic courts of the host state, or any other procedure agreed to by both contracting parties.​[26]​  In allowing investors from one contracting state to pursue arbitration with another contracting state, if the investor believes that a government has violated the underlying premise of an IIA, IIAs form the legal basis for ISDS. 
	Investment protection and ISDS have their origins in the post-World War II (WWII) era when investment protection was seen as a tool to attract FDI into developing countries. Investment flows became a crucial element of spurring economic growth in developing countries, but given the oftentimes fragile legal systems of developing countries and the associated political risks for investors, different ideas of investment protection emerged. ​[27]​ Germany was one of the first countries to create investment insurance programs and to negotiate BITs. Between 1959 and 1962 Germany entered into a dozen BITs, which set out any undertakings the parties to the agreement would have to guarantee, non-discrimination treatment and just compensation in the case of expropriation. Contrary to common perception, however, these early BITs did not have any ISDS provisions. ISDS was not adopted into BITs until the late 1960s.​[28]​ Germany’s early BITs were developed alongside the so-called Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, which Germany spearheaded.
	The German Society for the Protection of Foreign Investments, which was founded and led by Herman J. Abs, the Spokesman of the Board of Managing Directors of the Deutsche Bank, supported the development of an international ‘code of conduct’ for host governments in their treatment of FDI. Together with the former British Attorney-General Hartley Shawcross, Abs developed the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention in which the two authors: 
	envisaged that each party would accord fair and equitable treatment to the property of 	nationals of the other parties; that the property would be given the most constant 	protection and security and that its management, use and enjoyment would not be 	impaired by unreasonable or discriminatory measures; that each party would ensure the 	observance of any undertakings it had given in relation to investments made by national 	of any other party; and that no party would take any measures against nationals of 	another party to deprive them directly or indirectly of their property except under due 	process of law, and provided that such measures were not discriminatory or contrary to 	undertakings given by that part and were accompanied by the payment of just and 	effective compensation.​[29]​ 

Later this draft convention was introduced to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and eventually became known as the 1962 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Draft Convention and finally fed into the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 1965 Convention, which forms the basis of ISDS today.​[30]​
	Since the adoption of ISDS into BITs and other IIAs, investment protection standards are commonly based on four main guarantees: protection against discrimination, protection against expropriation without proper compensation, fair and equitable treatment and the protection of capital transfers. As can be seen when comparing these four principles to the above description of the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention they mirror what Abs and Shawcross have envisioned in their initial Draft Convention, highlighting the impact German and British thinking on investment protection had over time. The rules underlying these four core principles are typically based on either the World Bank’s ICSID Convention or on the United National Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). If any of the four guarantees are violated investors can send an arbitration notice to the host state, following which the arbitrators will be selected. Either party will usually choose one, with the third appointed as the chair by both.​[31]​ Awards are usually final and binding, meaning there are no avenues for appeal which makes ISDS a very controversial subject.
	 In March and April 2014 first newspaper articles emerged claiming that “Germany has introduced a stumbling block to landmark EU-US trade negotiations by insisting that any pact must exclude a contentious dispute settlement provision,” or that “Germany Reverses its Support for Investor-State Dispute Settlement in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.”​[32]​ A few months later, similar media coverage made the headlines with respect to Germany, the CETA and ISDS. Most notoriously so in July 2014 when the German newspapers Die Sueddeutsche Zeitung und Die ZEIT claimed that Germany opposed the Canada-EU CETA over concerns with respect to ISDS.​[33]​ According to an article written by Peter Clark, one of Canada’s leading international trade strategists, for IPolitics the Deputy German Economy Minister Stefan Kapferer explained that  
		‘The German government does not view as necessary stipulations on investor 			protection, including on arbitration cases between investors and the state with 			states that guarantee a resilient legal system and sufficient legal protection 				from independent national courts.’​[34]​ 

In Clark’s view Germany’s position as expressed by Minister Kapferer represents a shift away from Germany’s strong historic support for investor protection.​[35]​ 
	Germany’s opposition to ISDS in the CETA, as well as in the TTIP, was re-emphasized in September 2014 when Sigmar Gabriel, the leader of Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD), Vice-Chancellor and Economy Minister announced that he was against investor protection in the form of ISDS in both the CETA and the TTIP. According to an article in EurActiv he feared that through ISDS foreign investors will gain undue influence over Germany’s regulatory abilities as a state.​[36]​ Reportedly in a German parliamentary debate on September 25, 2014 Gabriel is quoted as saying that “‘It is completely clear that we reject these investment protection agreements,’” that Germany would try to get the ISDS clause in the CETA changed.​[37]​ 
	Gabriel’s statements echo a motion for removal of the ISDS provisions in the CETA that was put forward by numerous Members of the German Bundestag prior to the official German Parliamentary debates on the CETA and the TTIP on September 25, 2015. In this motion, said Members of the German Bundestag, members of Germany’s Green Party, Buendnis 90/ Die Gruenen, called for the German government to refuse any support for CETA as the agreement currently stands. ​[38]​ A similar motion was put forward by the German Left Party, Die Linke, which called on the German government to reject the CETA draft text as unacceptable the way it currently stands, and to make known to the EU Commission and other EU Member States that Germany will not accept ISDS in both the CETA and the TTIP.​[39]​ Both motions have been subject of further debate in the German Bundestag on December 15, 2014 without coming to any tentative results.​[40]​ In fact, with the EU’s publication of the ISDS Online Consultation Report, the opposition in the German Bundestag is calling for the government’s consideration of the consultation results in the TTIP and for a removal of ISDS as part of the CETA. A motion to this effect was put forward in preparation for the German parliamentary debates on January 16, 2015.​[41]​ Then on January 21, 2015 German Vice Chancellor and Minister for the Economy and Energy Gabriel and the German State Secretary for the Economy and Energy Matthias Machnig met with the French State Secretary for Foreign Trade, Tourism and the Foreign French Matthias Fekl in Berlin to discuss any challenges for trade politics, in particular the ISDS. Referring to the results of the EU’s consultation on ISDS the representatives of Germany and France issued a common declaration stating the need to incorporate said results into any future TTIP negotiations. Further, the issued declaration states that the consultation results should inspire more changes in the CETA when it comes to ISDS and that together with the EU and the other EU Member States Germany and France should check any options for changes in the CETA.​[42]​ 
	Given Germany’s longstanding history with respect to investment protection and the amount of BITs it has negotiated over time, these headlines and the presented claims with respect to Germany’s criticism of ISDS in the CETA and the TTIP seem surprising. Why would a country that has played such a big role in driving investment protection forward over time suddenly change its mind? The answer to this question is much more complex than it first appears and as this paper is arguing, has nothing to do with Canada or the CETA per se, but everything to do with the US and the TTIP. 
	Judging by publicly available information, throughout the CETA negotiations itself ISDS was largely a non-issue within Germany. A simple key word search through the German Bundestag website and the archived parliamentary records for ‘CETA and ISDS’ does not yield any results on the subject prior to January 27, 2014 at which point the EU-US negotiations were already in full swing and the EU-Canada negotiations nearly concluded.​[43]​ In a government response to questions from the opposition party Die Linke (The Left), the Ministry for the Economy and Energy, assures the opposition that the German Bundestag will be apprised of the negotiations between the EU and the US and that the EU Commission will share with the German government any relevant EU documents. In the same document, CETA gets mentioned in its connection to the TTIP and that the two agreements are part of the same strategy with respect to the EU’s trade policy.​[44]​ Similarly, to the website of the German Bundestag, that of the German government does not yield any search results on either ‘CETA’ or ‘investor protection’ prior to July 28, 2014 and June 2, 2014, respectively.​[45]​ The timing of these search results overlaps with the media coverage on Germany’s emerging opposition to ISDS in CETA mentioned above in this essay. It suggests the close connection between the CETA and the TTIP. 	Searching the German Bundestag’s website for ‘TTIP and ISDS’ leads to the same result as that of the ‘CETA and ISDS,’ namely that the first time the two transatlantic trade and investment treaties get mentioned as part of the Bundestag proceedings is January 27, 2014.​[46]​ Doing the same search on Germany’s government website leads to June 19, 2013 and the transcript of a joint press conference between US President Obama and German Chancellor Merkel, as the earliest available document mentioning the TTIP, a month before the TTIP negotiations officially started.​[47]​ These results further strengthen the observation that ISDS throughout the CETA negotiations themselves was largely a non-issue for Germany and that it was not until the TTIP negotiations were under way that the first debates on CETA and ISDS emerged within Germany’s parliamentary and government circles. 
	With the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 investment protection competences were transferred from the EU Member States to the EU. At that time the CETA negotiations were only starting, but given the indicated scope of CETA at the time these institutional changes to the EU’s governing structures were necessary to give the EU the capacity it needed to negotiate CETA on behalf of its Member States.​[48]​ Consequently, one could argue that Germany had no mandate to be critical of ISDS as part of CETA simply because it was within the mandate of the EU to negotiate CETA on behalf of the EU Member States. But, given Germany’s outspoken opposition to ISDS with respect to the TTIP once the negotiations for this agreement were fully under way, and by extension of ISDS in the CETA, the assumption that Germany had no mandate to oppose ISDS during the CETA negotiations is very weak at best. Once the prospect of a potential TTIP with the US became more prominent, and once public opposition within the EU, and within Germany against ISDS in the TTIP grew, Germany started voicing its concerns with respect to ISDS. If Germany wants to it will oppose and it will do so publicly as the above discussion points out. Therefore, the argument that Germany opposes ISDS primarily because it does not want it included in the agreement with the US gains more credibility.
	One could further argue that prior to the onset of the TTIP negotiations neither German politicians nor the German public ever had a chance to concern themselves with the prospects of ISDS in the CETA and what it would mean. If perhaps the EU had been as open about the CETA negotiations as it has been with those of the TTIP, similar opposition against ISDS as it is evident today might have surfaced much sooner. Given the secrecy behind the actual CETA negotiations and their content, this is a hypothesis that would be very hard to pinpoint exactly. Nevertheless, Section 3.7 of the Joint Report on the EU-Canada Scoping Exercise, which was published during a Canada-EU Summit in February 2009, clearly indicates the desire of both the EU and Canada to incorporate measures of investment protection into the potential agreement.​[49]​ This document was and is a matter of public record. Consequently, one could infer that if anyone in Germany or the German government itself was seriously concerned about the prospect of investment protection with Canada, said entities would have raised the issue much sooner. The fact that this has not been the case further indicates that nobody in Germany is seriously worried about the idea of investment protection with Canada or the inclusion of ISDS in what is now the Canada-EU CETA. Stemming from the argument presented thus far in this part of the essay, then, is the assumption that ISDS in the CETA has now become a matter of concern in Germany because the CETA is seen as a ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP. And it is ISDS within the TTIP that most opponents of ISDS in the transatlantic free trade debate are actually worried about. 
Part III: CETA as a ‘Blueprint’ for TTIP 
	In Germany and elsewhere in the EU, the Canada-EU CETA is seen as a ‘blueprint’ for the EU-US TTIP. According to the Oxford Dictionary a ‘blueprint’ for something means “a plan which shows what can be achieved and how.”​[50]​ Applying this definition to the two transatlantic trade and investment agreements would mean that whatever can be achieved with the CETA can be achieved with the TTIP following a similar pattern or layout of the different provisions. In other words, the idea of a ‘blueprint’ entails the belief that if something is the case with the CETA in terms of certain provisions, such as the inclusion of ISDS; they would automatically, or most likely, also be included with the TTIP. In fact, throughout the history of transatlantic relations the EU has followed a mirror approach when it comes to North America. One agreement, declaration or cooperation initiative with Canada is usually followed by a similar one with the US and vice versa and the two transatlantic trade and investment treaties; CETA and TTIP are no exception to this rule.​[51]​ They are a continuation of a long standing trend in which the EU looks at Canada and the US with one lens, which effectively ties the CETA directly to the TTIP. 
	Even before the TTIP negotiations started, it was very clear that the CETA is part of a larger strategy. Official EU portrayals of the CETA at the time clearly singled Canada out as one of the only developed countries, the EU was currently negotiating an ambitious FTA with. The same portrayals perceived of  “Canada as one of the ‘second tier of countries immediately following those identified as priority partners.’”​[52]​ In fact, the former EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht clearly hinted at CETA being a “‘benchmark and blueprint for what [the EU] can do in the future with countries of a similar level of development’”​[53]​ and in its 2011 Trade and Investment Barriers Report the EU clearly states that “the US is a future target for closer investment and trade cooperation, similar to the scope of what the EU is currently negotiating with Canada, in terms of the CETA.”​[54]​ Consequently, from the very outset of the CETA negotiations it was clear that the CETA would serve a higher purpose, namely that of allowing the EU to practice for more difficult negotiations with countries such as the US. It was not by accident that the EU used the relevant ISDS sections from the draft CETA for its online survey on ISDS in the TTIP.​[55]​ The current debate surrounding ISDS in the CETA and the TTIP are therefore two sides of the same coin. This is true for Germany, just as much as it is true for the EU as a whole. 
	In a recent speech at a SPD free trade conference on February 23, 2015, German Vice Chancellor and leader of the SPD Sigmar Gabriel, highlighted the strategic importance of CETA in promoting higher environmental, consumer and labor standards as well as in the overall wellbeing of citizens. Further, he indicated the importance of CETA in influencing the current negotiations for the TTIP, especially with respect to ISDS.​[56]​ Similar sentiments are expressed in the motion to oppose the TTIP and the CETA brought forward by the German Left Party on September 24, 2014 as well as the motion by the German Green party on January 14, 2015 to respect and act on the results and recommendations in the EU’s ISDS Online Consultation Report.​[57]​ The same is true for the German government itself, even though it gives the impression to downplay CETA’s role as a ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP. Evidence for this assumption is found in the German government’s communication with the opposition on the TTIP in January 2014. 	When asked directly whether the CETA serves as a ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP the direct answer was no. Though indirectly, the government hints at the fact. In speaking on the connection between the CETA and the TTIP the government highlights the fact that both agreements are part of the same EU trade strategy. Furthermore in answering questions concerning ISDS in the CETA the government responds by saying that even though Germany does not consider ISDS as necessary for agreements between different members of the OECD, the layout and basic principles of the ISDS chapter in the CETA are of the utmost importance as it has precedent building powers for future EU agreements with ISDS.​[58]​ While not directly saying that the ISDS chapter in the CETA serves as a ‘blueprint’ for that of the TTIP, the answer to the question indirectly says so.
	Operating under the assumption that the CETA is indeed seen as a ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP the question becomes why the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP, following the example of the CETA is seen as such a bad thing for Germany. The answer to this question is twofold and explains why opposing ISDS in the CETA is just as important as it is in the TTIP. First, there is the idea or more accurately the fear that through an ISDS mechanism in the CETA American companies could open subsidiaries in Canada and use the CETA to sue the German government. 
	In their report Trading Away Democracy- How CETA’s Investor Protection Rules Threaten the Public Good in Canada and the EU, Pia Eberhardt, Blair Redlin and Cecile Toubeau decry the CETA as a “Trojan horse for US corporations.”​[59]​ Through CETA, they claim “Canadian subsidiaries of US-headquartered multinationals […] will be able to use CETA to launch investor-state challenges against European governments- even if the EU eventually excludes or limits [ISDS] within the [TTIP].”​[60]​ The reason why this would be so worrying is explained with the assumption that US companies dominate the Canadian economy. In fact, they claim, that US companies are notorious for their aggressive use of ISDS globally, “having filed 22 percent (127 cases) of all known investor-state cases by the end of 2013.”​[61]​ Further, according to their allegations statistical evidence suggests investment arbitrators commonly adopt investor-friendly interpretations of investment law if the investor comes from the US.​[62]​ The report has been published by several Canadian and European civil society organizations and NGOs in both sides of the Atlantic, including Berlin and is therefore indicative of public opinion on the issue not only in the EU as a whole, but also in Germany. 
	Similar sentiments as are expressed in the just mentioned report are also expressed in the mainstream media who highlight citizens’ fears of US companies gaining the ability to “overturn EU laws on genetic engineering, environmental protection and food quality,” and who use the claims brought forward against the Canadian government by US companies under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to illustrate the powers of US corporations and their readiness to sue.​[63]​ Underlying the worry of US companies using CETA to sue European governments as it is expressed in the report by Pia Eberhardt, Blair Redlin and Cecile Toubeau and the debate in the mainstream media is the plain simple fear of US corporate greed and the possibility of a US litigation boom, the second answer to the question of why the inclusion of ISDS is seen as such a bad thing for Germany. 
	Fears of US corporate greed have also been expressed in the responses to the EU’s ISDS online consultation. In the ISDS Online Consultation Report, the EU states that “many respondents express fear that the introduction of investment protection in TTIP would unjustifiably give corporations even more power than they already possess.”​[64]​ Feeding these fears at the general level is the perception that the inclusion of ISDS in either the TTIP or the CETA would lead to American companies eroding the regulatory powers of the German government. When asked about the exceptions and limitations to ISDS as they were defined in the CETA draft text which was used in the consultation, respondents articulated their “fear that the proposed provisions might not adequately preserve the right to regulate, in particular for public services, because the sectoral exceptions are perceived as insufficient or vague.”​[65]​ Around 145,000 responses to the survey were submitted collectively through NGOs, an additional 3144 responses were individual responses from EU citizens, and another 445 replies were individual replies from either NGOs, business associations, academics, trade unions and so on. Of all the responses submitted 21.8 percent came from within Germany, the third largest percentage of the total responses received.​[66]​ Leaving the methodology and resulting merits of the consultation as a subject for future research, it can nevertheless be inferred that EU citizens and German citizens in particular, are wary of corporate power and the associated negative impacts on a state’s regulatory abilities. 
	When thinking about the fears of US corporate greed as it is expressed by NGOs or civil society organizations, or the mainstream media, particular attention has to be paid to the pending suit against Germany at the ICSID in Washington DC. In May 2012 the Swedish energy company Vattenfall filed a request for arbitration against Germany over its declared moratorium on nuclear energy.​[67]​ Relying in its claims on the Energy Charter, a plurilateral IIA, of which both Sweden and Germany are contracting partners, Vattenfall argues it has a right to be compensated for any financial losses stemming from Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy. Germany’s decision to end nuclear power generation occurred in response to the Fukushima disaster in Japan in March 2011 and ultimately led to the closure of Vattenfall’s power plants in Kruemmel and Brunsbuettel in Germany. The company claims it is not against a change in direction with respect to German energy policy-making, but nevertheless has a right to be compensated. Talking about its suit against Germany on its website, Vattenfall states that 
	if a foreign company has made major investments in a high-resource industry such as 	nuclear power under the precondition that this type of energy will be part of the local 	energy system, then the company should not have to assume the consequences of a 	political change.​[68]​
   
	Vattenfall’s arbitration suit against Germany has become the poster child of Germany’s opposition to ISDS. According to Pia Eberhardt, a researcher with Corporate Europe Observatory who also co-authored the report Trading Away Democracy- How CETA’s Investor Protection Rules Threaten the Public Good in Canada and the EU says, the suit showed Germany what it is like to be the recipient of an ISDS claim and gave Germany firsthand experience with the negative aspects of ISDS.​[69]​ Vattenfall’s suit against Germany is seen as an example of a corporation wanting to impede or profit from a government’s decision to change policy. According to the Spiegel, one of Germany’s most reputable news magazines, supporters of TTIP point out that Germany has not been the recipient of many ISDS suits such as the one by Vattenfall. But, as the same article points out, “Germany doesn’t have any comprehensive investor protection provisions in the trade deals it currently has on the books with the United States.”​[70]​ The article further points out that once TTIP goes into effect, there is definite potential for further arbitration suits similar to the one by Vattenfall. Gus van Harten, a professor of international law in Toronto is quoted in the article as saying that with TTIP, “I see potential for many new cases.”​[71]​ The articles captures much of the fear that exists within Germany with respect to TTIP and any potential ISDS suits coming from US companies, all triggered by Germany’s recent experience with Vattenfall. 
	Leaving the justification of the Vattenfall suit, or investment arbitration in general aside for future research, the Vattenfall suit and the potential for suits against the German government as a result of either the TTIP or the CETA also factors into German government debates. Featured in these debates is the German government on the one side, and the official opposition parties on the other. In the already above highlighted opposition party motions, both the German Green Party and the Left Party make references to Vattenfall and are requesting a removal of ISDS from both the CETA and the TTIP. They further demand a reopening of the CETA as well as an outright rejection of the CETA should ISDS not be taken out of the agreement.​[72]​ Vis-à-vis these motions is the government coalition. The fractions of the ruling party are defending the merits of both agreements, but given the results of the EU ISDS consultation call for more transparency, an appeal mechanism and possibly the inclusion of the Federal Court of Justice of Germany into the investment arbitration process.​[73]​ Efforts on behalf of the German government to bridge the outright objection of ISDS in the CETA and thereby also in the TTIP, is most recently represented in a speech given by the German Vice Chancellor at a SPD conference on transatlantic free trade. In this speech, dated February 23, 2015, the Vice Chancellor makes concrete proposals for possible changes in CETA. To be precise, he highlights the importance of transatlantic free trade and the role CETA plays as a ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP. Further, he calls for: the possibility of subsequent changes to protection standards, equal treatment of foreign investors with domestic ones and finally for carve outs for banking transaction and debt haircuts. More generally, Gabriel calls for more clearly defined rules with respect to investment protection, an appellate mechanism as well as the creation of an international investment arbitration court.​[74]​ This speech and the proposals brought forward within are clearly aimed at bridging the divide over ISDS and the two transatlantic trade and investment agreements. They aim to address public and opposition concerns with respect to ISDS and make clear how connected the CETA is to the TTIP. 
	Interestingly enough, the debate surrounding ISDS in Germany is mainly happening between the Vice Chancellor, the opposition parties and the public. In contrast, other than defending ISDS in both agreements, German Chancellor Merkel has been rather quiet on the subject, claiming that any potential negative consequences of ISDS would be outweighed by the positive aspect of either agreement.​[75]​ Consequently, there is not one German position on ISDS per se. At least not until the debates in the German Bundestag have come a potential and final decision on the issue of ISDS as it pertains to both the CETA and the TTIP. In the meantime, Germany’s position on ISDS is characterized by many different voices with those of the opposition parties, Germany civil society organizations and the Vice Chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel currently being the loudest. Arising from that is the impression that Germany is against ISDS in the TTIP, and therefore also in the CETA. Given the role of CETA as a ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP any opposition to ISDS in the TTIP automatically mandates an opposition to ISDS in the CETA. 

Conclusions
	In February 2015 ISDS is at the epicenter of the transatlantic trade and investment debate. Without it the negotiations for both the CETA and the TTIP would hardly stir up any controversy. Criticized for a lack of an appeal mechanism, for a lack of transparency and for being a threat to democracy it has captured much of the debate surrounding the two transatlantic trade and investment agreements. Triggered by the onset of the TTIP negotiations, opposition against ISDS in both agreements has grown stronger all across the EU, including Germany. Triggered by Germany’s recent experience with Vattenfall and the perceived threat against Germany’s ability to change environmental and energy policies much of German civil society has organized against ISDS, fearing a US litigation boom. Opposition against ISDS is targeted against both the CETA and the TTIP. With the perception that CETA is a ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP many fear that if ISDS will be a part of CETA it will automatically also be a part of the TTIP. Similarly, many opponents to ISDS fear that any ISDS provisions in the CETA will open the door for US companies to open subsidiaries in Canada and use CETA to sue against the German and other EU Member State governments. It is for these two reasons that an opposition against ISDS in the CETA is just as necessary as it is against the TTIP itself. In a way, they are two sides of the same coin and the opposition against ISDS in the TTIP is thereby motivated by fears of US corporate greed. 
	Whether or not the reasons for or against ISDS in both trade and investment agreements are justified is a very interesting question, but was not subject of discussion in this essay. Rather, this essay looked closer at the emergence of Germany’s perceived opposition against ISDS in both the CETA and the TTIP. A country which is seen as an originator of investment protection has apparently turned against it leading to questions of why. The answer to this question is complex and has primarily to do with the TTIP and the underlying fears of US corporations seemingly impacting the government ability to regulate in the name of the environment or public health, similar to what Vattenfall is perceived to be doing. By nature of politics, politicians respond to the opposition brought forward against ISDS. And in the name of consistency opponents want it either changed or removed from both the CETA and the TTIP altogether. 
	What exactly will come out of Germany’s Vice Chancellor’s proposals for improvements to the ISDS chapter in the CETA as well as the current debates with respect to ISDS in the German Bundestag is as of late February 2014 still unclear. Depending on how the debate plays out within Germany, the German government may or may not directly ask the EU to either reopen CETA or veto it during the ratification process. How far exactly Germany and by extension the EU will go with respect to ISDS in the CETA will ultimately depend on how far the EU thinks it will get with respect to ISDS in the TTIP. On the one hand, CETA is the ‘blueprint’ for the TTIP, but on the other hand, the willingness of the US to either forgo ISDS or to allow for a ‘modernization’ of ISDS provisions beyond what is currently in the CETA, will determine how far the EU is willing to go with respect to ISDS in the CETA. The fate of the CETA is thereby ultimately tied to that of the TTIP. 
	Given the overall approach to North America and the idea that maybe one day a trade and investment agreement between the EU and the entire NAFTA area could be a reality mandates a common approach to both the CETA and the TTIP, including and especially with respect to ISDS. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the two agreements will feature different provisions on something that has become so important to so many people. CETA has always been more important to Canada than it has ever been to the EU and its Member States. From the outset, the CETA negotiations were tainted with the possibility of a future agreement between the EU and the US. With the onset of the TTIP negotiations this possibility has now become a reality. Consequently, any future moves with respect to ISDS and the CETA will depend on what the EU thinks it can achieve with respect to the TTIP. 
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